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TOURO LAW REVIEW
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Gonzales3048
(decided June 14, 1993)
The defendant claimed that his statutory3049 and constitutional
rights3050 to be protected against warrantless searches and
seizures were violated, whereby an officer stopped and frisked
him based on a description which did not match the one obtained
from an anonymous tip transmitted over the police radio. In
addition, the defendant claimed that the officer improperly
performed the "pat down" by using a "hard frisk," which caused
drugs to "pop out" of the defendant's waistband. 3051 The hearing
court held that the police acted on reasonable suspicion because
"not only was the defendant the only one at the scene who
3048. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 30, 1993, at 21 (Crim. Ct. New York County June
14, 1993).
3049. N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1), (3) (McKinney 1992). Section
140.50(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law provides in pertinent part: "[a]
police officer may stop a person in a public place located within a geographical
area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such
person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either ... a felony
or... a misdemeanor .... and may demand of him his name, address and
an explanation of his conduct. Id. Section 140.50(3) of the Criminal Procedure
Law provides in pertinent part: "When upon stopping a person under
circumstances prescribed in subdivision[] one.. ., and a police
officer... reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may
search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance
readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily
carried in public places by law-abiding persons .... Id.
3050. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Section 12 provides in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
3051. Gonzales, N.Y. L.J., at 21.
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matched the description; he was the only person at the
scene."3052 The court further held that the way in which the pat
down had been conducted did not violate defendant's
constitutional rights, reasoning that because the defendant wore
various layers of clothing, a light touch would not have indicated
presence of a weapon to the officer. 3053 Since the officer's search
had been limited to the outside of the defendant's garments and to
the ascertainment of whether a weapon was present, the frisk was
within state and federal constitutional limitations.3054
Officer Michael Connor testified at the Mapp/Huntley hearing
that on April 10, 1993, he and four other officers were on foot
patrol.3055 Officer Connor was standing on the southeast comer
of 110th Street and Lexington Avenue when he received a radio
transmission, based on an anonymous tip, describing a person
with a gun as a "male black" wearing a. black rain coat and a
gray hat, and carrying a "reddish" umbrella.3 05 6 It was also
reported in the radio broadcast that the suspect was located on the
comer of 109th Street and Lexington Avenue, and the gun was
alleged to be in his jacket pocket.3057 At the time of the
transmission, Officer Connor spotted the defendant on the next
corner. 305 8 The defendant was wearing a grayish colored rain
suit and a baseball hat, and was holding a "reddish"
umbrella. 3059 The officers did not see anyone else on the comer,
and the officers approached the defendant without drawing their
guns. 3060 Upon approaching the suspect, Officer Connor noted
that under the rain suit, the defendant wore a suede jacket, a shirt
and another pair of pants. 3061
3052. Id. (citations omitted).
3053. Id.
3054. Id.
3055. Id.
3056. Id.
3057. Id.
3058. Id.
3059. Id.
3060. Id.
3061. Id.
19941 1309
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While one officer began to frisk the defendant to determine
whether he was carrying a weapon, the defendant kept trying to
lower his left arm, preventing the officer from feeling his
waist. 3062 Officer Connor and a third officer took over the frisk,
forcing the defendant to keep his arms elevated. 3063 As Officer
Connor proceeded with the frisk, eight packets of heroin fell
from the clothing at defendant's waist. 30 64 The defendant was
arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the seventh degree. 3065 He now argues that the
drugs seized from him should be suppressed. 3066
First, the suppression court found that the specificity of the
radio transmission, and the degree to which the defendant
matched the description, provided the police with the "reasonable
suspicion" needed to properly stop and frisk the defendant. 3067
The court stated that "[a] description may be sufficiently specific
and congruous even where every detail is not accurate" to
establish reasonable suspicion. 3068 The court found that the
3062. Id.
3063. Id.
3064. Id.
3065. Id. This charge was reduced from criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree. Id. at 21 n. 1.
3066. Id. at 21.
3067. Id.
3068. Id. (citing People v. Washington, 182 A.D.2d 520, 521, 582 N.Y.S.2d
416, 417 (1st Dep't) (finding that the officer had a reasonable basis to assume
that the defendant had committed the crime, because the officer immediately
arrived at the scene and saw the defendant, who fit the general description of
the broadcast and who was also the only individual in the vicinity)), appeal
denied, 80 N.Y.2d 840, 600 N.E.2d 651, 587 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1992); see also
People v. Fernandez, 58 N.Y.2d 791, 793, 445 N.E.2d 639, 640, 459
N.Y.S.2d 256, 257-58 (1983) (stating that because there was an unusual
identifying element in that defendant was carrying a white shirt and was
standing in the same geographic area described in the tip, there was reasonable
suspicion despite the fact that defendant's hairstyle and height were not
identical to the tip's description). Cf. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352
N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976) (finding, in the companion case of
People v. LePene, that the information communicated by an anonymous tip
was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant,
because the description of the suspect lacked specificity). In DeBour, the court
of appeals enunciated the standard that "the information possessed by the
1310 [Vol 10
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defendant not only matched the anonymous tip, but he was the
only person at the location at the time of the radio
transmission. 3069 Furthermore, the court found that Officer
Connor acted reasonably by not drawing his gun, even though the
arrest occurred in a high crime area. 3070 Therefore, these facts
provided the police with the reasonable suspicion necessary to
stop and frisk the defendant. 3071
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the reasoning of
several New York State court decisions. The court found that
"[t]he facts of the instant proceeding.., even more compelling
than those of People v. Salaman3072 and People v. Olsen." 3073 In
Salaman, the court of appeals justified a stop and frisk, which
was based on an officer's independent observations, corroborated
with information received from an anonymous tip. 3074 The
arresting officer had received an anonymous tip that a black male
wearing a beige overcoat and maroon hooded sweatshirt was at
South Fifth Avenue and West Third Street in the City of Mount
Vernon with a gun.30 75 Although approximately twenty-five
people were in .the area, the defendant was the only person
matching the description given by the anonymous tip.3076
police along with the attendant circumstances including any exigencies must be
evaluated in order to assess the legality of the police action." Id. at 223, 352
N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
3069. Gonzales, N.Y. L.J. at 21; see also People v. Middleton, 119 A.D.2d
593, 595, 500 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (2d Dep't) (stating that "[hiaving arrived at
the scene almost immediately and having spotted the defendant, who fit the
general description of the broadcast and was also the only individual in the
area, the officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that the defendant might be
the perpetrator of the crime") (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d
915, 501 N.E.2d 609, 508 N.Y.S.2d 1036 (1986).
3070. Gonzales, N.Y. L.J., at 21.
3071. Id.
3072. 71 N.Y.2d 869, 870, 522 N.E.2d 1048, 1049, 527 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751
(1988).
3073. 93 A.D.2d 824, 460 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2d Dep't 1983); Gonzales, N.Y.
L.J., at 21.
3074. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d at 870, 522 N.E.2d at 1048, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
751.
3075. Id.
3076. Id.
1994] 1311
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Balancing the degree of intrusion of the police conduct against
the "precipitating and attending circumstances," 3077 the court
found the officer was justified in believing the defendant was in
fact armed. 3078 The court also noted that the officer could not
have acted unreasonably, because he did not draw his gun and it
was night time in a high crime area. 3079
Similarly, in Olsen, the Appellate Division, Second
Department held that to sustain conduct that is more intrusive
than detaining a suspect for questioning, the "quality of the
information [received] must be otherwise established." ' 3080 The
court concluded that when an officer is able to corroborate "by
personal observation," details received by an anonymous tip
which are "so specific and congruous with that which was
actually encountered," the information may be assumed to be
reliable. 3081 The court found that the initial information
communicated to the officer, "a man with a gun," was too
general, and was therefore insufficient to justify the stop and
frisk.3082 However, the informant's additional information,
"there were three people at the end of the bar and ... the one in
3077. Id. (citing People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 352 N.E.2d 562,
571, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 384 (1976)). See also People v. James, 194 A.D.2d
558, 558, 598 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (2d Dep't) (stating that it is "well settled
that '[a]ny inquiry into the propriety of police conduct must weigh the degree
of the intrusion it entails against the precipitating and attending
circumstances"') (citations omitted), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 720, 622
N.E.2d 318, 602 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1993);
3078. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d at 870, 522 N.E.2d at 1048, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
751.
3079. Id.
3080. People v. Olsen, 93 A.D.2d 824, 460 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (2d Dep't
1993).
3081. Id. at 824, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 830; see also People v. Stewart, 41
N.Y.2d 65, 69, 359 N.E.2d 379, 387, 390 N.Y.S.2d 870, 870 (1976).
Without independent corroboration by the police an "anonymous tip giving a
general description" will not warrant a stop and frisk and will only give the
police the "common law power to inquire for purposes of maintaining the
status quo until additional information can be acquired." "Id.
3082. Olsen, 93 A.D.2d at 824, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
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the middle, wearing blue jeans and a blue jacket had a gun," was
more specific, thereby justifying a stop and frisk.3083
The United States Supreme Court has applied a similar level of
review in deciding when an anonymous tip reaches the level of
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. 30 84 In
Alabama v. White,3085 the Court found that an anonymous tip,
corroborated by police observations, provided the reasonable
suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop. 3086 In IWite,
police received an anonymous tip that a woman possessing
cocaine was leaving her home, in a brown Plymouth station
wagon with broken taillights, to go to Dobey's Motel. 3087 Two
officers followed the woman to Dobey's Motel, where they asked
her to step out of her car. 3088 The officers told her that she was
suspected of carrying cocaine, and she consented to a search of
her car. 3089 The officers found marijuana in a locked attach6
case, and upon arresting her, found cocaine in her purse.3090
In White, the Court found reasonable suspicion to make a
lawful stop and search, and stated that
[r]easonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon
both the content of information possessed by police and its
degree of reliability. Both factors - quantity and quality - are
considered in the totality of the circumstances - the whole
picture, that must be taken into account when evaluating whether
there is reasonable suspicion.309 1
Although an anonymous tip may not be reliable, the Court
reasoned that further police investigation to verify criminal
activity, will authorize a stop. 3092
3083. Id.
3084. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972).
3085. White, 496 U.S. at 325.
3086. Id. at 326-27.
3087. Id. at 327.
3088. Id.
3089. Id.
3090. Id.
3091. Id. at 330 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
3092. Id. at 329.
1994] 1313
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The Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test,3093
which "critically" considers the informant's veracity, reliability
and basis of knowledge for determining probable cause. 3094
However, the White Court required a lesser standard to determine
reasonable suspicion by finding the "critical" factor to be
relevant, rather than "highly relevant." 3095 The Court found that
although all of the informant's details were not accurate, there
was sufficient indicia of reliability based on the officer's
immediate corroboration of the informant's tip. 3096
The Gonzales court also addressed the defendant's contention
that the frisk was improper because it was not a "pat-down," but
instead a "hard frisk." 3097 The court held that under the
circumstances, the manner in which the frisk had been conducted
was proper under the New York and United States
Constitutions. 3098 The court found that it was necessary for the
officer to firmly pat down the defendant's clothes to determine if
the defendant possessed a weapon. 3099 The hard frisk was
justified for two reasons. First, the defendant wore various layers
of clothing, which would not permit a light frisk to reveal any
concealed weapons. 3100  Second, the defendant had been
uncooperative during the first attempt at the pat down by
constantly putting his arms down, thereby preventing a proper
protective search. 3 10 1
The Gonzales court distinguished the facts of People v.
Diaz3102 and Minnesota v. Dickerson3103 to find the frisk
permissible pursuant to the State and Federal Constitutions. 3104
In Diaz, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the extension
3093. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
3094. Id. at 328.
3095. Id.
3096. Id. at 331-32.
3097. Gonzales, N.Y. L.J., at 21.
3098. Id.
3099. Id.
3100. Id.
3101. Id.
3102. 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993).
3103. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
3104. Gonzales, N.Y. L.J., at 21.
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of the "plain view" doctrine to a "plain touch" exception to the
warrant requirement. 3 105 The court held that an officer may not
seize drugs felt during a frisk, because "[t]he narrow scope of
intrusion authorized during a protective pat-down may not exceed
what is necessary to ascertaining the presence of weapons." 3 106
The court reasoned that the theory behind the justification for the
plain view exception could not be logically extended to concealed
items. 3 10 7 If an item is concealed, there still exists a legitimate
expectation that the item will remain private. 3 10 8 Therefore, the
court of appeals held that an officer cannot reach into the clothes
of a suspect simply because the officer felt something that might
be incriminating. 3109 In Gonzales, the court distinguished Diaz
by reasoning that Officer Connor's search was only an intrusion
of the outside of the defendant's garments, and was therefore
within the limits of the New York Constitution.3 1 10
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expanded the plain
view exception to plain touch. In Dickerson, the Court found that
"[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing
and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's
privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for
3105. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 107, 612 N.E.2d at 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
3106. Id. at 109, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 942 (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (holding that a search for weapons without
probable cause to arrest must be limited to "that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officers or others
nearby")).
3107. Id. at 110, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
3108. Id. at 110-11, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943. The court
stated many reasons for not expanding the plain view exception to plain-touch
including: (1) the identity and criminal nature of a concealed item is not going
to be discernible with a mere touch or pat, (2) knowledge of what an item is
from feeling it stems from the officer's experience which cannot be equated
with the information perceived when an item is in plain view, and (3) the
courts feared that the expansion of the plain-view doctrine would "blur[] the
limits [of a] Teny search." Id. at 112, 612 N.E.2d at 302, 595 N.Y.S.2d at
944.
3109. Id. at 109, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
3110. Gonzales, N.Y. L.J., at 21.
1994] 1315
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weapons .... ,,3111 Therefore, the when the Court recognized
the plain touch exception under the United States Constitution, it
limited this exception to the exploration of weapons.3112 Once it
has been determined that no weapon is present, the reason for the
search ceases to exist and therefore, evidence obtained after the
initial search for weapons is suppressible. 3 113 In Gonzales, the
court distinguished Dickerson by finding that Officer Connor had
limited the search of the defendant to the "ascertainment of
whether a weapon was present." 3 114 It was during this lawful
search that the drugs fell out and the officer properly seized the
evidence. 3 115 When Officer Connor conducted the legal search
for weapons, and the drugs subsequently fell out, Connor was not
expected nor required to "turn his back or to return the drugs to
the defendant."'3 116
Accordingly, the suppression court in Gonzales found that the
stop of the defendant was based on reasonable suspicion, and the
manner in which the defendant was frisked fell within the scope
of state and federal constitutional protections, therefore, the
evidence could not be suppressed. 3 117
3111. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993); see also
United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421,429 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a
bag's contents could be examined under the "plain feel" version of the "plain
view" doctrine); United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 122 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that "evidence revealed by touch in the course of a frisk is
admissible, under what the Second Circuit has characterized as the 'plain feel'
version of the 'plain view' doctrine if the feel was proper").
3112. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136.
3113. Id. at 2138-39.
3114. Gonzales, at 21.
3115. Id.
3116. Id.
3117. Id.
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